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CASE COMMENT 
TO ENFORCE A PRIVACY RIGHT: THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
CANON AND THE PRIVACY ACT’S CIVIL REMEDIES 
PROVISION AFTER COOPER 
Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012) 
Daniel J. DiMatteo∗ 
 In 2005, a joint investigation between separate government agencies 
revealed that Stanmore Cooper, a pilot, failed to disclose to the Federal 
Aviation Administration that he was HIV positive.1 Cooper sued the 
agencies in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California,2 claiming that they violated the Privacy Act by disclosing his 
medical records to one another without his consent.3 Alleging that the 
unlawful disclosure of his condition caused him severe emotional distress, 
Cooper sought monetary relief under the Privacy Act’s civil remedies 
provision, which establishes a cause of action against the government for 
“actual damages.”4 The dispositive issue in Federal Aviation 
Administration v. Cooper was whether the term “actual damages” includes 
damages for emotional or mental harm. 
Despite finding that the agencies violated the Privacy Act, the district 
court granted summary judgment to the agencies, holding that the Act did 
not authorize damage awards for emotional or mental harm.5 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
order.6 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, when read in connection with the 
entirety of the Act, the civil remedy provision’s “actual damages” language 
unambiguously includes emotional or mental harm.7 The circuit court 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ J.D. 2013, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to thank the Florida 
Law Review for the opportunity to publish this Comment and contribute to the increasingly 
important dialogue over privacy rights in America in the twenty-first century. 
 1. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1446–47 (2012). Cooper had omitted information about 
his condition when applying to renew his medical certificate in 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. He 
was indicted on multiple counts of making fraudulent statements to a government agency and 
sentenced to two years of probation. Id. at 1447. 
 2. Cooper v. FAA, 816 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 3. Id. at 781, 784–85. With certain exceptions, the Privacy Act of 1974 makes it “unlawful 
for an agency to disclose a record to another agency without the written consent of the person to 
whom the record pertains. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).” Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1447 n.2.  
 4. If a government agency violates the Privacy Act “in such a way as to have an adverse 
effect on an individual,” the Act’s civil remedies provision authorizes the injured individual to 
bring a civil action against that agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (2006). If the agency’s violation 
was “intentional or willful,” the United States is liable to the individual for “actual damages.” 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2006).   
 5. Cooper, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 790–92.  
 6. Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 7. See id. at 1033–34. 
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denied a request for an en banc rehearing, and the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.8 Reversing the circuit court by a 5–3 vote,9 the 
Supreme Court held that the Privacy Act’s civil remedies provision does 
not “unequivocally authorize” the government’s waiver of immunity from 
monetary damages for emotional or mental harm.10 
The Supreme Court majority reached its decision by construing the 
Privacy Act’s civil remedies provision according to the “sovereign 
immunity canon,” a canon of construction used to determine whether the 
government has waived immunity with respect to a particular claim or 
remedy.11 The canon provides that courts must “strictly construe[]” waivers 
of sovereign immunity “in favor of the Government.”12 While courts have 
historically construed waivers of immunity narrowly,13 the canon of 
sovereign immunity underwent substantial evolution and refinement in the 
late twentieth century.14  
Because of its insight into mid-twentieth century sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence, McMahon v. United States15 serves as an appropriate 
starting point for tracking the canon of sovereign immunity’s evolution 
over the last sixty years. The issue before the Court in McMahon was 
whether a law’s two-year limitations period commenced on either (1) the 
date that the party actually suffered the injury, or (2) an administrative 
disallowance of the party’s claim.16 The plain text of the statute was 
ambiguous, stating only that if a party’s claim is “administratively 
disallowed in whole or in part,” the party has until “two years after the 
cause of action arises” to sue.17 The McMahon Court articulated and 
applied the principle that “statutes which waive immunity of the United 
States from suit are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.”18 
While the Court did not deem the petitioner’s interpretation implausible, it 
construed the statute’s ambiguity in favor of the government, and denied 
relief to the petitioner.19  
                                                                                                                     
 8. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1448. 
 9. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the decision. Id. at 1456. 
 10. Id. at 1456.  
 11. See id. at 1448, 1453. 
 12. Id. at 1447. 
 13. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 561 (2008).  
 14. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (noting that a waiver of sovereign immunity 
must clearly appear in a statute’s text, not merely a statute’s legislative history); Irwin v. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990) (holding that, once a waiver was established, equitable 
tolling could apply to suits against the government if it did not significantly broaden the waiver). 
 15. 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951).   
 16. See McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1951). 
 17. Id. at 26.  
 18. Id. at 27 (citations omitted). 
 19. See id. 
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Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs20 illustrates the evolution of 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence from the broad principle articulated in 
McMahon into a more refined canon of construction. In Irwin, the Supreme 
Court declined to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to a Civil Rights 
Act suit against the government.21 The statute of limitations required that 
suits against the government be filed “‘[w]ithin thirty days of receipt of 
notice of final action taken’” by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC).22 Because he was out of town, the petitioner’s 
attorney did not actually receive the EEOC’s letter of notice until two 
weeks after it arrived by mail, causing the petitioner to file late.23 Declaring 
that waivers of immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed,”24 the Supreme Court declined to imply that the limitations 
period commenced only with “actual” receipt of notice and ruled against 
the petitioner.25 Articulating a rule against waiver by implication and 
requiring a waiver’s unequivocal expression,26 the Court again resolved an 
ambiguity to the government’s benefit, construing a waiver “strictly in 
favor of the government.” 
Like Cooper, Lane v. Pena27 concerned waivers of immunity from 
remedies rather than claims,28 giving Lane greater comparative value than 
Irwin or McMahon. In Lane, the petitioner claimed that the government 
excluded him from a “‘program or activity conducted by any Executive 
agency’” because he was disabled, violating the Rehabilitation Act.29 The 
civil remedies provision, however, failed to expressly authorize monetary 
damages for this category of violator, though it did so for another category 
of violator.30 Applying the canon’s rule that a textual ambiguity exists if 
there is more than one “plausible interpretation” of the text,31 the Court 
considered the civil remedies provision ambiguous. Construing this 
ambiguity in favor of the government, the Supreme Court ruled against the 
petitioner. The Court held that the law failed to provide “clarity of 
expression necessary to establish a waiver of the Government’s sovereign 
                                                                                                                     
 20. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).  
 21. Id. at 96. 
 22. Id. at 92. 
 23. Id. at 91. 
 24. Id. at 95 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. See id. at 93–96. 
 26. See id. at 95. 
 27. 518 U.S. 187 (1996).  
 28. Id. at 189. 
 29. Id. at 189–90 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988, Supp. V)). 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) authorizes monetary damages against “any recipient of Federal 
assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2006). 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) makes it unlawful for “any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” to discriminate against an otherwise qualified 
individual solely on the basis of a disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). 
 31. See FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012) (citing United States v. Nordic Village, 
Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34, 37 (1992)). 
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immunity against monetary damages.”32  
Prior to its decision in Cooper, there was no obvious indication as to 
how the Supreme Court would rule on whether the Privacy Act’s term 
“actual damages” authorized damages for emotional or mental harm. Case 
precedent offered little clarity. Unlike Lane, for instance, where a civil 
remedy provision’s omission of a particular phrase presented an ambiguity 
to be construed in favor of immunity, Cooper concerns the construction of 
a statutory term of art.33 In a majority opinion written by Justice Samuel 
Alito, the Court took the canon of sovereign immunity in an even stricter 
direction, construing the term “actual damages” as too ambiguous to waive 
the government’s immunity from damages for emotional or mental harm.34 
The Court began its analysis of the issue by highlighting the Privacy 
Act’s failure to define “actual damages.”35 The Court summarily rejected 
the Respondent’s argument that the term should be construed based on the 
“ordinary meaning” of the word “actual.”36 The Court also rejected the 
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “actual damages” as “circular.”37 But 
most importantly, the Court rejected these textbook definitions based on 
the reasoning that the meaning of a legal term of art “changes with the 
specific statute in which it is found.”38 This principle set the stage for the 
Court’s analysis. Rather than accepting a textbook definition of “actual 
damages,” the Court explained the term’s “chameleon-like quality,”39 
reviewing its history of taking on alternative meanings depending on the 
statute in which it was found.40 The Court found no definitive 
understanding of the term.41 Instead, in the Court came to a conclusion all 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192. 
 33. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1449 (“‘[A]ctual damages’ is a legal term of art . . . .”). 
 34. See id. at 1453–56.  
 35. See id. at 1449. 
 36. See id. (“[I]t is a ‘cardinal rule of statutory construction’ that, when Congress employs a 
term of art, ‘it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each 
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.’”). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. (quoting Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1029 (9th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 39. Id. at 1450 (“Because the term ‘actual damages’ has this chameleon-like quality, we 
cannot rely on any all-purpose definition but must consider the particular context in which the term 
appears.”). 
 40. The Court contrasted how “actual damages” is used in the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 
U.S.C. § 3613(c); and Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o, with how it 
is used in the wrongful-death provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2674; 
the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970); and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78bb(a). Id. at 1449–50. As used in the FHA and FCRA, courts have construed “‘actual’ 
damages” to include damages for emotional or mental harm. Id. at 1449. On the other hand, as used 
in the FTCA, Congress defined actual damages to exclude damages for emotional or mental harm. 
Id.  Courts have construed “actual damages” in the contexts of the Copyright Act and Securities 
Exchange Act to allow only economic damages. Id. at 1449–50. 
 41. See id. at 1450. 
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too familiar to sovereign immunity cases:42 the Court considered the text of 
the statute ambiguous.43  
According to the canon of sovereign immunity, a statute fails to 
“unequivocally” waive immunity from damages, and is therefore 
ambiguous, when there is any “plausible interpretation” of the text that 
would not allow damages.44 The Court formed a number of such plausible 
interpretations, establishing a basis for finding the text ambiguous.45 The 
Court, for instance, revealed parallels between the Privacy Act and the 
common law tort of libel per quod, which bars recovery for emotional or 
mental harm unless economic damages are established first.46 Moreover, 
the Court emphasized that “actual damages” do not include emotional or 
mental harm in the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Securities Exchange Act, 
and the Copyright Act.47 The majority acknowledged that it was not 
“inconceivable” to construe the term “actual damages” to allow monetary 
relief for emotional or mental harm, as the Ninth Circuit and Respondent 
did.48 However, the Court explained that the mere plausibility of a 
construction authorizing damages fails to overcome the presumption of 
immunity that arises whenever there is an ambiguity in the text.49  
The Court stayed faithful to the canon of sovereign immunity’s 
instruction to strictly construe waivers of immunity “in favor of the 
Government.”50 The majority followed Lane’s footsteps,  recognizing an 
ambiguity when the text failed to clearly assert a waiver of immunity.51 
The Court adhered to the rule articulated in Irwin, that waivers of 
immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed,”52 and 
declined to imply a waiver of immunity from liability for emotional or 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192–94 (1996); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 
U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951). 
 43. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1453.  
 44. Id. at 1448 (“Ambiguity exists if there is a plausible interpretation of the statute that 
would not authorize money damages against the Government.”) (citing United States v. Nordic 
Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34, 37 (1992)). 
 45. See id. at 1449–53. 
 46. See id. at 1451 (“This parallel between the Privacy Act and the common-law torts of libel 
per quod and slander suggests the possibility that Congress intended the term ‘actual damages’ in 
the Act to mean special damages. The basic idea is that Privacy Act victims, like victims of libel per 
quod or slander, are barred from any recovery unless they can first show actual—that is, pecuniary 
or material—harm.”).  
 47. See id. at 1449–50. 
 48. Id. at 1453.  
 49. Id. (“We do not claim that the contrary reading of the statute accepted by the Court of 
Appeals and advanced now by respondent is inconceivable. But because the Privacy Act waives the 
Federal Government’s sovereign immunity, the question we must answer is whether it is plausible 
to read the statute, as the Government does, to authorize only damages for economic loss.”).  
 50. See id. at 1447. 
 51. See id. at 1453; Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). 
 52. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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mental harm, though such a construction was not “inconceivable.”53 And 
the Court ratified the rule exercised in McMahon, that statutes waiving the 
government’s immunity are to be strictly construed in favor of the 
sovereign,54 and resolved the Privacy Act’s ambiguity in favor of the 
government. Accordingly, the Court held that the Privacy Act does not 
waive the government’s sovereign immunity from liability for emotional or 
mental harm, and reversed the Ninth Circuit.55  
Because the Court seemed to reach its conclusion by adhering to a 
cohesive line of case precedent, it may be tempting to view Cooper as 
ordinary and to overlook Cooper’s potential ramifications. On closer 
inspection, however, Cooper carries consequences greater than those of its 
predecessors. Applying the canon of sovereign immunity, both McMahon 
and Irwin merely tilted the limitations periods of two statutes in a more 
pro-immunity direction.56 Lane went substantially further in strengthening 
the government’s immunity in that it eliminated the remedy of monetary 
damages; however, it did so only with respect to a particular class of 
violators.57 In McMahon, Irwin, and Lane, the Supreme Court placed new 
limits on a party’s ability to sue the government, but the Court left the 
remedial design of each statute mostly intact. Cooper failed to extend to 
the Privacy Act the same courtesy.  
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the 
majority’s decision in Cooper completely eliminated the remedy for the 
“primary, and often only, damages sustained as a result of an invasion of 
privacy, namely mental or emotional distress.”58 She explained that as a 
result, the Court’s holding “cripples the Act’s core purpose of redressing 
and deterring violations of privacy interests,”59 rendering the civil remedies 
provision “impotent in the face of concededly unlawful agency action.”60  
While the dissent did not dismiss the canon of sovereign immunity’s 
usefulness in general,61 the dissent rejected the degree of rigor with which 
the majority applied the canon.62 The dissent reasoned that the canon 
                                                                                                                     
 53. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1453. 
 54. McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951). 
 55. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1456.   
 56. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96; McMahon, 342 U.S. at 27. 
 57. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192–93, 200 (holding that the Rehabilitation Act did not 
unequivocally authorize monetary damages against any “programs or activities conducted by any  
Executive agency”).  
 58. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1456 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
Justice Stephen Breyer joined Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 1463. 
 61. See id. at 1455 n.12 (majority opinion) (“[A]lthough the dissent belittles the sovereign 
immunity canon, the dissent does not call for its abandonment.”).  
 62. See id. at 1456 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The canon simply cannot bear the weight the 
majority ascribes it.”). 
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should not displace “the other traditional tools of statutory construction.”63 
Developing its point, the dissent declared that the plain meaning rule of 
construction should control, and that a court should only utilize the canon 
of sovereign immunity if the text’s plain meaning is unclear.64 The dissent 
argued that the plain meaning of “actual damages” unambiguously includes 
damages for emotional or mental harm.65 The dissent reasoned that this 
plain reading is the appropriate construction because it “best effectuates the 
statute’s basic purpose.”66 The dissent concluded that because the text 
speaks clearly, the majority should not have reached for the canon of 
sovereign immunity, a canon designed to construe ambiguous texts.67  
 The majority and minority agreed that ambiguities should be resolved 
in favor of immunity. The central disagreement, rather, was over what 
qualifies as a textual ambiguity in the first place. The majority would have 
found statutory text ambiguous when it is subject to more than one 
“plausible interpretation”68—a sweeping method that is likely to identify 
textual ambiguity quite often. Finding the term “actual damages” used 
alternatively in a variety of contexts led the majority to discern a plausible, 
alternative interpretation of the term,69 rendering it ambiguous. In 
comparison, making greater use of “traditional tools of statutory 
construction,” the minority would evaluate whether the plain meaning of 
the text comports with the statute’s substantive provisions and remedial 
objectives.70 This method would potentially construe the scope of a waiver 
more expansively.71  
In contemplation of Cooper’s ramifications for civil remedy provisions 
throughout federal law, practitioners should consider a few points. Any 
claim in which relevant textual language possesses “chameleon-like” 
qualities—like the Privacy Act’s “actual damages”—will likely face strict 
construction of that language. Before filing, practitioners should research 
whether relevant statutory text assumes any alternate meanings in other 
statutes. Researching this could better enable a practitioner to (1) decide 
whether the claim is worth filing; (2) consider alternative litigation 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Id. (quoting Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 589 (2008)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 64. Id. at 1456–58 (“Here, traditional tools of statutory construction . . . provide a clear 
answer: The term ‘actual damages’ permits recovery for all injuries established by competent 
evidence in the record, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, and so encompasses damages for 
mental and emotional distress.”). 
 65. See id. at 1457–58.  
 66. Id. at 1462. 
 67. Id. at 1456–58 (“There is no need to seek refuge in a canon of construction.”). 
 68. See id. at 1448 (majority opinion) (“Ambiguity exists if there is a plausible interpretation 
of the statute that would not authorize money damages against the Government.”). 
 69. See id. at 1449–53. 
 70. See id. at 1456, 1458–59 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “the statute’s text, 
structure, drafting history, and purpose” provide clearer statutory construction).  
 71. See id. at 1456–58. 
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strategies; and (3) anticipate counterarguments that the text is 
ambiguous—specifically arguments that the text is subject to more than 
one “plausible interpretation.”  
A generation from now, legal scholars may view Cooper as the moment 
the Supreme Court erected a mountainous barrier to public accountability. 
The Privacy Act, which was enacted to protect “an individual against an 
invasion of personal privacy,”72 now offers no remedy to an individual 
harmed by an intentional or willful violation unless that individual can 
prove economic damages, no matter how debilitating the individual’s 
emotional or mental distress.73 In practice, this remaining semblance of a 
remedy will exist, mostly, only in name. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
said during oral arguments, an individual whose privacy has been violated 
typically “doesn’t have out-of-pocket costs but is terribly distressed, 
nervous, anxious, and all the rest.”74 The dissenting opinion echoed Justice 
Ginsburg’s point, describing emotional or mental harm as “the primary, 
and often only, damages sustained as a result of an invasion of privacy.”75  
If the Court’s repudiation of the Privacy Act’s remedial purpose is any 
indication of how courts will begin construing remedial provisions, people 
unlawfully harmed by public officials will have no meaningful opportunity 
to seek compensation for their injuries. This is repugnant to the notion of 
public accountability. The minority’s approach to construing waivers of 
immunity is worth considering, however, because it may someday be law. 
The Court’s decision, after all, came down to a 5–3 split. It is quite 
possible that the recused Justice Kagan will join the dissenting justices 
next time the Court construes a waiver of immunity. In that case, the 
Supreme Court would be a single vote away from restoring operation to 
remedial provisions throughout the United States Code. 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 1462 (quoting Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896 
(1974)).  
 73. See id. at 1463. 
 74. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, FAA v. Cooper, No. 10-1024 (2011).  
 75. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1456 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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